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Back in the start of the year, with Donald Trump’s election pledges to end the war in Ukraine “within 24 hours” remaining vivid in minds, there was genuine concern in the Russian capital over Trump’s plans. After Mr. Trump suggested that “high levels of Taxes, Duties, and Restrictions” on Russia might be necessary, one prominent hawkish Moscow commentator wrote: “It is better to prepare for the worst. Before long, we’ll reflect on Biden’s term with fondness, like a thaw.”

Unfulfilled Threats and Missed Chances

How mistaken was that view? Since then, the US president has repeatedly spoken a big game without coming close to walking the walk. By May, when Vladimir Putin rejected a month-long truce, and peace talks in Turkey stalled, a devastating” US penalties package did not to appear. An 8 August deadline for Mr Putin to consent to a halt in fighting inexplicably morphed into a red carpet welcome in Alaska, where Mr Trump applauded a figure sought for atrocities as he stepped off from his plane. The “severe consequences” warned of by Mr Trump if the Alaska talks failed to peace never occur.

Emboldened Moves and Allied Weaknesses

Emboldened, Mr Putin has thus persisted to prosecute his war aims in Ukraine, and probe for western weaknesses. The previous week’s intrusion of Russian drones into Polish territory exposed insufficient Nato planning, as F-35 and F-16 fighter jets were quickly scrambled to counter cheap kamikaze devices that cost around $ten thousand each to produce. It also sent a warning of possible escalation in the event of any future “deterrence force” deploying European troops on Ukrainian soil. This kind of challenge called for a strong and coordinated response, exerting the kind of pressure on the Kremlin which Mr Trump has to date refused to consider. Instead the US president appears, yet again, to prefer bullying his European allies to confronting Mr Putin. In a statement which smacked of insincerity, Mr Trump stated over the weekend that the US was “ready” to impose stricter sanctions on Russia, but only if certain improbable conditions were met.

Impractical Requirements and Economic Leverage

Eyeing a considerable economic gain, Washington is insisting that the EU must boost its imports of US LNG at a rate that analysts judge undoable. Other demands include the application by the EU of 50%-100% tariffs on Russia’s most important ally, China, and an end to all imports of Russian oil by Nato members. This includes Turkey, which has refused to sanction Moscow, imports 57% of its oil from Russia, and lies outside the EU.

Observers looking on the positive side in Brussels believe that Mr Trump’s pressure may convince pro-Trump governments in Hungary and Slovakia to end their deep dependence on Russian energy imports. That is highly unlikely to happen, as Mr Trump and his advisers must know. Nor can the EU afford to risk the kind of economic retaliation from Beijing that caused Mr Trump himself to retreat from a full-blown trade war recently.

Ominous Events and Absence of Action

During this week’s state visit, it will be Sir Keir Starmer’s turn to try to press Mr Trump down on concrete action. But from the fruitless Alaska talks to his latest diversionary tactics with the EU, Mr Trump keeps finding reasons not to get tough on Russia. Last week’s drone incursion in Poland represented an worrying raising of the ante. Ukraine’s prospects, and wider European security interests, are being gradually undermined by a president who, in this context, barks but never acts.